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the "Greening" of International Trade Law
INTRODUCTION
T he interrelationship between trade laws and agreements and pro-
tection of the environment is a much-debated topic these days.
Everyone from the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)' to the governor of California2 to international environ-
mental organizations 3 has jumped into the fray. While some argue that
free trade is the best hope for reversing environmental degradation,
others see it as a primary cause of such degradation.
Institutions and agencies have begun to move. The GATT recently
reactivated its long-dormant Working Group on Environmental Mea-
sures and International Trade.4 The Working Group, originally
established in 1971 to study whether the trade-related provisions of in-
ternational environmental agreements conform to GATT, had never
convened. Additionally, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) has been working for several years on the
issue through its Trade and Environment Directorates, starting
from the principle that states should recognize the "importance
"Assistant Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San
Francisco. J.D., University of California-Berkeley, 1990; M.A., Universtiy of Cali-
fornia-Berkeley, 1990; B.A., Universtiy of California-Berkeley, 1978. The author
wrote this article while serving as a Riesenfeld Fellow in International Law and
Organization at Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley. She would like to thank
Nannette Ahmed and John Orcutt for their research assistance, David Caron and
Kristin Dawkins for their helpful comments, and many people at Greenpeace for their
feedback on an earlier draft.
See, e.g., Trade and the Environment, GA'T Doc. 1529 (Feb. 12, 1992).
2 See, e.g., Pete Wilson, Free Trade is Good for the Environment, S.F. CHRON.,
May 2, 1992, at A20.
3 See, e.g., CHARLES ARDEN-CLARK, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIwFS AND
TRADE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnON AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1991) (World
Wildlife Fed'n Int'l); UNCED UNDERMINED: WiIY FREETRADE WON'T SAVE THE PLANET
(Greenpeace Int'l, 1992).
" See Committee Says Existing GATT Rules Could Cover Environmental Issues, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 505 (Mar. 18, 1992).
[57]
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of preserving both the environment and the open multilaterial trading
system." ' However, a February 1992 effort to establish guidelines to
harmonize trade and environment ended inconclusively when experts
from each field could not agree.6 Similarly, the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development (UNCED) has touched on
the issue. For example, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development calls for an open trading system as the best
way to ensure environmental protection,7 while Rio's Agenda 218 and
its Forestry Principles 9 also refer to the need for open trade.
"Greening" international trade law will not be easy. Trade special-
ists and environmentalists start from different premises and privilege
different values. While trade specialists generally prefer to see unfet-
tered markets, environmentalists point to market failures and condemn
common trade practices which externalize environmental costs.'0 Simi-
Joint Report on Trade and the Environment 3, OECD Doc. ComIENU/EC/
TD(91)14/REV.2 (May 14, 1991). A 1991 meeting of experts from these two
directorates set out the issues involved in the trade-environment interface as:
[Tihe possible negative effects on the environment of certain economic policies
which affect trade patterns and trade practices, in the absence of internalisation
of environmental costs or the absence of adequate environmental regulations.
Also there is concern that trade policies and agreements do not sufficiently
consider environmental impacts. Trade concerns relate primarily to the increas-
ing use and suggestions to use restrictive trade measures to enforce diverging
national environmental policies and the risk that environmental justifications
may be abused in disguising protectionist motives.
Id.
OECD's Effort to Develop Guidelines on Trade, Environment Hits Major Snag,
15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 106 (Feb. 26, 1992).
' Principle 12 declares:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all
countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade
policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as
possible, be based on an international consensus.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/REV. 1
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).
' See generally AGENDA 21 AND THE UNCED Pocstmos (Nicholas A. Robinson
ed., 1992).
' See Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/6/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992).
"0 See generally HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD:
REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE EvNIONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE
FutrutE (1989).
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larly, while trade specialists often focus on economics, many environ-
mentalists view market forces as subordinate to moral values and
concerns for planetary survival.
Several authoritative sources establish the principles and rules of trade
law. The most important is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GAIT)," which was first signed in 1947, and which now regulates trade
among over a hundred member countries. The body of GAT law in-
cludes not only the specific text of GAIT, but also various interpreta-
tions of the text made over time by expert panels formed to resolve dis-
putes between member states. GAIT rules also form the basis for exist-
ing and proposed regional trade agreements in Europe and North America.
Ascertaining basic principles of international environmental law and
policy is less straightforward, since few binding treaties specifically
enunciate these principles. Although most environmental treaties focus
on sectoral issues, such as pollution of a given area or protection of
certain species, rather than broadly applicable overriding principles, it
is nonetheless possible to derive certain overriding principles by ex-
amining oft-repeated treaty provisions. In addition, non-binding reso-
lutions, declarations, and statements of conferences and expert commis-
sions provide guidance in defining how a global environmental law
should look. These include the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 12 the World Charter for Nature, 3 the legal principles
proposed by experts working with the Brundtland Commission,14 and
the results of several regional conferences on the environment. 5 These
principles constitute "soft law." That is, while they are not technically
binding on states as are treaties, they may over time create international
legal obligations based on ordinary custom and usage, and may be
incorporated into more traditional treaty instruments.
16
This article focuses on two major emerging principles of environm en-
tal law, the precautionary principle and the participatory imperative, and
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
'2 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, G.A. Res.
2994 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1, § I, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
'3 World Charter for Nature. Oct. 28,1982, G.A. Res. 37/7,37 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp.
(No. 51) 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51, 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983).
'4 The Brundtland Commission produced an influential report on sustainable
development, which outlines a set of legal principles necessary to accompany the
changes envisioned. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENv'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987).
's See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Soft Law, 163
R.C.A.D.I. 164 (1979); Tadeusz Gurchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understand-
ing Soft Law, 30 McGILL L.J. 37 (1984).
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contrasts them with the current rules of trade agreements. Parts I and
II examine the current structure of GATT in light of these principles,
and conclude that while simple amendments to the GAT language will
suffice in some areas to bring GAIT law into line with these environ-
mental principles, in other areas more fundamental differences exist
which are not easily resolved within the structure of the current agree-
ments. Parts III and IV propose modifications to the agreement, and
recommend institutional changes necessary to bring the trade rules more
closely into line with the precautionary and participatory principles. The
author hopes that an understanding of the underlying differences in the
trade and environmental paradigms will facilitate the development of
the guiding principles necessary to make trade agreements better serve
planetary sustainability.
I
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: BURDENS OF PROOF,
CLEAN PRODUCTION, AND PREVENTATIVE ACTION
A. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle recognizes the need for environmental
regulation to proceed in the face of inevitable scientific uncertainty: "[ilts
purpose is to encourage perhaps even oblige decisionmakers to consider
the likely harmful effects of their activities on the environment before they
pursue those activities.""' Accordingly, the precautionary principle rep-
resents a fundamental shift in approach to environmental regulation.
The precautionary approach developed in response to several decades
of ineffective pollution control regulations. These emissions- and waste-
related regulations assume the environment has the capacity to assimi-
late and detoxify a vast quantity and variety of harmful contaminants;
their aim is to ensure that contaminants are dispersed, diluted, or trans-
formed to render them virtually harmless." Under this regulatory
approach, industry complies through "add-on" or "end-of-the-pipe"
pollution control technologies rather than through changes in industrial
or agricultural processes and practices.
" James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C.
INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
" Ken Geiser. The Greening of Industry: Pollution Control in a Sustainable
Industry, TECH. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1991, at64,66; see also Ellen Hey, The Precaution-
ary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO.
INr'L ENvTL. L. REV. 303, 305-306 (1992).
[Vol.7, 1992]
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As we now know, this assimilative capacity approach fails to recog-
nize the complex interactions that have turned substances previously
thought harmless, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), and methane gas (CH4), into some of the world's most chal-
lenging environmental problems. Many toxic substances accumulate in
the atmosphere, oceans, and rivers, and subsequently in the tissues of
plants, animals, and humans. Moreover, it is impossible for regulators
to establish "acceptable" discharge or emission limits on even a frac-
tion of the substances used in modem industry, much less discover the
complex interactions and synergies among them. Furthermore, studies
show that environmental quality improves consistently over time only
where contaminants are no longer used, rather than simply reduced or
transferred from one medium to another. 9 All these factors have led
to a reevaluation of the need for an approach which stops potentially
dangerous substances from entering the environment rather than clean-
ing them up afterward.
The precautionary principle is rapidly assuming a central role in
international environmental law. The World Charter for Nature phrased
the principle in terms of the burden of proof:
Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall
be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall
demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to
nature, and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood,
the activities should not proceed2
More recent endorsements of the principle include the 1987 Second
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,2' the 1990
Bergen Ministerial Declaration," the 1990 Ministerial Declaration on
'9 For example, a review of pollution control regulations in the United States found
the assimilative capacity approaches behind the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts had
not worked well. Since the mid-1970s, air quality across the country has improved
marginally, while water quality has, in most areas, remained constant or worsened.
See Geiser, supra note 18, at 67 (citing study by Barry Commoner). In contrast, where
contaminants were banned or phased out, such as lead in paint, strontium 90 in milk,
mercury in the Great Lakes, and DDT and PCBs generally, environmental persistence
and bioaccumulation of the contaminants decreased substantially. Id.
" World Charter for Nature, supra note 13, art. Il/b.
21 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea: Ministerial
Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25. 1987, art. VII, 27 I.L.M. 835,
838 (1988) ("A precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to
control inputs of [dangerousl substances even before a causal link has been established
by absolutely clear scientific evidence.").
I Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region,
May 16, 1990, art. 7 [hereinafter Bergen Declaration] ("Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.").
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Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and the
Pacific,23 and the most recent meeting of the United Nations Environ-
mental Program (UNEP) Governing Council." The precautionary prin-
ciple also is a major component of the Bamako Convention on Haz-
ardous Wastes in Africa.25
The precautionary approach contains several elements which are
relevant to trade and environment concerns. One is that pollution should
be prevented, not controlled, because prevention is better than cleanup
and cleanup is not always possible. To achieve prevention, environmen-
tal concerns must be built into public and private economic activity at
the source of pollution, rather than addressed as an afterthought.
A second aspect concerns the burden of proof:
The burden of proof should not be on one concerned with the
protection of the environment to demonstrate conclusive harm but
rather on the prospective polluter to demonstrate no harm if the
pattern of environmental degradation is to be reversed. Adoption
of the precautionary approach implies a shift in approach from
giving the contaminant the benefit of the doubt to giving the ben-
efit of the doubt to the environment and human health. When doubt
exists regarding the impact on the environment and human health,
let us err on the side of safety rather than risk significant and
irreversible damage.2
A third aspect of the precautionary principle concerns the quantum
of proof required for action. In the face of limited scientific evidence, the
threat of environmental degradation, even without proof of a causal link
between emissions and effects, should be enough to justify regulation.27
" Ministerial Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Develop-
ment in Asia and the Pacific, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC38, Annex 2 (1990)
[hereinafter Bangkok Declaration] ('To achieve sustainable development, policies
must be based on the precautionary principle.").
24 Proceedings of the Governing Council, U.N. Envtl. Program, 16th Sess., U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GC16/27 (1991).
I' Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art.
4.1.f., 30 I.L.M. 773, 781 (1991) (requiring a precautionary approach to prevent
release into the environment of substances which may harm humans or the environ-
ment without waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm).
26 GREENPPtACE INT'L, PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRoNMENT THROUGH THE "PRECAUTION-
ARY ACTION" APPROACH 3 (July 1990). See also Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 17,
at 12 ("[P]recautionary action, properly understood, involves some shift in the burden
of proof, towards those who would pollute, of demonstrating that the pollution is not
serious or likely to cause irreversible harm.").
" See Hey, supra note 18, at 308-09, for a thorough discussion of the quantum of
proof required for action under the precautionary approach.
[Vol.7, 1992]
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Trade law, as exemplified by GAIT, violates all these aspects of the
precautionary approach. The "grow now, pay later" approach to eco-
nomic growth propounded by free trade advocates is inimical to pre-
cautionary principles. Trade law places the burden of proof for envi-
ronmental regulation on the regulating state, not on those seeking to
overcome the regulation to sell goods more easily. As discussed be-
low, current interpretations of GATT make the switch to pollution
prevention and clean production processes more difficult.
B. Growth and Environmental Protection
Free trade advocates argue that trade enhances environmental protec-
tion by creating the economic growth necessary to allow countries to
spend more on environmental regulation and enforcement. Society,
therefore, should concentrate on growing, which requires an open trad-
ing system grounded in free market principles. Once growth is achieved,
or once per capita income passes a certain threshold,' countries will
then spend the funds necessary to clean the environment. There is no
need to incorporate environmental concerns into the economic system
itself. Rather, environmental protection naturally will result from the
system's proper and unfettered operation. Arguments that expanded
economic growth has led to environmental degradation are met with
the response that more growth will solve the problem. The U.S. admin-
istration used this argument to defend putting environmental consid-
erations on a separate "parallel" track to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) talks, rather than incorporating them directly into
the negotiations."
The fundamental problem with this argument is that it reflects a two-
step approach at odds with the concept that ecology must be integrated
into economy. As the Brundtland Commission stated: "the ability to
anticipate and prevent environmental damage requires that the ecologi-
cal dimensions of policy be considered at the same time as the eco-
2 The GAIT Secretariat endorses the view linking per capita income with emission
levels of certain pollutants. See Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 18. The
Secretariat relies on a study describing decreases in sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions
when per capita gross domestic product (GDP) exceeds $5000 (1988 U.S. dollars). Id.
(citing G.H. Grossman & A.B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American
Free Trade Agreement 15 (1991) (prepared for a conference on the U.S.-Mexico Free
Trade Agreement, Princeton University, Oct. 1991)). The inference is clear: if per
capita income increases to some theoretical threshold, then society will voluntarily
spend more on environmental protections, and the consequences of unregulated
industrialization and urbanization will take care of themselves.
2 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE RE'., REvIEw oF U.S.-MExIco ENvinoNw.NTAL
IssuEs 4-51 (1992).
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nomic, trade, energy, agricultural and other dimensions."3° Following
this two-step approach, the best way to protect the environment is to
expand global economic deregulation through trade liberalization, and
unleash more growth to pay for environmental safeguards. Indeed, trade
liberalization is the aim of the current round of GAT talks.3' But a
"pollute it to grow now, clean it later with the proceeds" approach is
not ecologically sound. Many instances of environmental degradation
are irreversible or have unforeseen ramifications. In any case, it is much
more expensive to remedy existing environmental damage than to
prevent it.32
To incorporate a preventative approach, trade agreements should focus
attention on their environmental consequences from the start. Addition-
ally, funds resulting from expanded trade should be earmarked for
increased environmental protection. 33 This requires a departure from
'0 WORLD COMM'N ON ENVT AND DEv., supra note 14, para. 28.
"' See generally, The Uruguay Round and the Future of World Trade, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1992); CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, REcoLoNIzAION: GATT, THE URUGUAY
RouND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
12 ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENvIRoNmErAL LAW 6 (1991)
(preference for preventative over remedial action). A good example is Taiwan, where
after years of export-driven growth with little thought for the environmental conse-
quences, the Taiwanese are finding dead lakes and rivers which will be difficult if not
impossible to revive. See Charles P. Wallace, Pollution is Price of Asia Boom, L.A.
TnMEs, Feb. 15, 1991, at Al.
13 For example, critics have pointed to the explosive trade-led growth in Mexico's
maquiladora region as a case study in the negative environmental effects of unregu-
lated trade liberalization. See, e.g., Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
May 6, 1991, at 34-41; NATIONAL Wi.DL E FED'N, ENVmoNmErrAL CONCERNS RELATED
TO A U.S.-CANADA-MEXiCO FREE TRADE AoREEmiEr 4-20 (1990). In the maquiladora
region, the Mexican government created a special trade zone just south of the U.S.
border to induce foreign industrial development and production. As large corporations
relocated to the border area to reap the substantial benefits of low wages and lax
environmental enforcement, air, land, and water pollution reached dangerous heights,
prompting the American Medical Association to label the border area "a virtual
cesspool and breeding ground for infectious diseases." A Permanent U.S.-Mexico
Border Environmental Health Commission, 263 J.A.M.A. 3320 (1990). While the
current administration has recognized the severity of these problems, see, e.g., OFFmcE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 29, at 58-188, its response falls in line with its
domestic trickle-down economic policies: the expanded financial resources made
available through trade eventually will result in additional allocations for environmen-
tal protections. See President George Bush, Address at the Hispanic Free Trade
Breakfast (Apr. 8, 1991), reprinted in Fast Track and Trade Opportunities, 2 U.S.
DEP'T CoM. DIsPATCH 253 (1991). Yet like the GATI Secretariat, the current admin-
istration has never clearly explained how or why these additional financial resources
will translate into enhanced environmental protections, nor have there been assurances
that such trade-generated revenues will not filter down to other uses, such as increased
luxury consumption, real estate investment, or other social priorities.
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unfettered trade liberalization and deregulation.3 The market can be
harnessed to serve environmental goals, but only in conjunction with
other approaches; it cannot be trusted to do the job alone.
C. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Trade rules, as typified by GATT, are designed to ensure the fewest
possible barriers to trade.' For example, the most-favored-nation (MFN)
provisions of GATT' require countries which confer tariff or other
benefits or restrictions on one trading partner to apply the same ben-
efits or restrictions to all other trading partners. In addition, GATT's
national treatment provisions' require domestic and foreign industry
to be treated alike with respect to taxes, standards, and other regula-
tions. Moreover, even regulations that by their terms treat domestic and
imported products alike may be challenged as violations of the national
treatment obligation if their effect is to favor domestic industry.m Sub-
sidies to domestic industry are discouraged if they increase exports or
reduce imports, 39 and quotas, bans, or licensing systems on either
imports or exports are prohibited. 4°
Environmental and health regulations have been challenged under one
or more of these GATT provisions, despite GAIT Article XX, which
provides exceptions to these rules for regulations concerning, inter alia,
human, animal, or plant health, or conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.' The fundamental problem with Article XX is that it is
3' In addition, moving to the integrated vision of ecologically sound development
will require a redefinition of what constitutes growth. So long as Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) remains the basic measure, growth simply will be a function of physical
output. This must change. Environmentally destructive activities count as a contribu-
tion to GDP, as do the activities needed to clean up their mess. Growth should not be
seen as an end in itself, but as a means to equitably distributed and ecologically sound
development. See DALY & COBB, supra note 10, at 368-75.
" See generally John H. Jackson, Equality and Discrimination in International
Law (IX): The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 Y.B. iNr'L TRADE 244
(1983).
GAiT, supra note 11, art. I.
Id., art. III. See generally John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and
Non-Tariff Barriers, 10 Mic. J. INT'L L. 207 (1989).
Jackson, supra note 37, at 215-19.
GATT, supra note 11, art. XVI.
40 Id., art. XI.
41 Importantly, nowhere does GATT explicitly mention the word "environment."
The provisions of Article XX relevant to environmental concerns read:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
HeinOnline -- 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 65 1992
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framed as an exception to the GATT rules, and as such is to be nar-
rowly construed. 2 By putting the burden of proof on the party defend-
ing its regulations rather than on the party proposing the activity con-
flicting with those regulations, trade assumes primacy over the pres-
ervation of the world's environment. This burden of proof is contrary
to the precautionary principle, which requires that potentially damag-
ing activities be regulated or prohibited unless no doubt exists as to their
safety. Conversely, GATT casts a presumption in favor of the proposed
activity, which must be allowed unless those seeking to prohibit or
regulate the activity meet a specified burden. And, as the following cases
show, the burden of proof is a heavy one.
Under Article XX(b)'s measures "necessary to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health," the key word is "necessary," and several
decisions of GAT dispute resolution panels have developed a restric-
tive and subjective meaning for that term. In the Thai Cigarette case,43
U.S. cigarette manufacturers challenged the Thai government's ban on
imported cigarettes, arguing it constituted disguised protection for the
local government cigarette monopoly. Thailand argued that even though
it allowed domestic cigarette sales, the government carefully controlled
the amounts and types sold as part of a program to decrease smoking;
that U.S. cigarettes were more aggressively marketed towards new
smokers; and that imported cigarettes contain additives that encouraged
new smokers. The GAIT Panel rejected these arguments, holding the
import ban was "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b) only
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or] . . . (g) relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Id., art. XX.
Environmental advocates proposed adding a new section to cover environmental
protection more explicitly. See, e.g., Eric Christensen & Samantha Geffin, GATT Sets
Its Net on Environmental Regulation: The Gan Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin
Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System, 23 Mtmit
INTE-AM. L. Rlv. 569,608 (1991) (proposing to allow trade restrictions "imposed for
the protection of the environment, ecological or biological resources, consumer or
animal welfare, whether within or outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party
enacting the measure."). Although this proposal would clarify the scope of the
environmental exception, it would not affect the current allocation of the burden of
proof.
42 In other words, doubts about whether Article XX applies in a given case will be
resolved against its application. See, e.g., Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. 1/6268, Nov. 20, 1987, reprinted in
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (B.I.S.D.) 35S/98, 114 (1989) [hereinafter
Unprocessed Herring case](narrowly applying Article XX(g)).
43 Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Report of the Panel, B.I.S.D. 36S/392 (1990) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette case].
[Vol.7, 1992]
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if there was no "alternative measure which [the regulating state] could
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with
other GATT provisions."
The Panel went on to find that alternative anti-smoking strategies
existed, such as ingredient disclosure labels on packages and limits on
advertising,' despite the questionable effectiveness of such alterna-
tives.'46 In reaching its conclusion, the Panel rejected the views of the
World Health Organization, which relied on experiences elsewhere to
conclude that "the opening of closed cigarette markets dominated by
a state tobacco monopoly resulted in an increase in smoking."'7 Thus,
the Panel found the Thai measures unnecessary despite evidence both
that the measures were legitimate means to reduce the incidence of
smoking and that alternatives would not be as effective.
The Thai Cigarette case implies that if no GATT-consistent measures
are available, GATT requires governments to use the least trade-restric-
tive measure available, regardless of its efficacy in health or safety
terms." While it is possible to imagine a wide range of possible regu-
latory responses to health, safety, or environmental problems, the Panel
insisted that a single criterion, trade efficiency, should replace both en-
vironmental and health concerns, and neglected the sometimes delicate
balancing of interests that goes into domestic rulemaking.
In the recent decision on tuna and dolphins (Tuna-Dolphin deci-
sion),49 a GATr Panel upheld a Mexican challenge to the portions of
the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) which imposed a
ban on tuna imports harvested in a manner resulting in excessive dolphin
mortality.' The Panel held the import ban violated GATT Article Xl's
prohibition on quantitative trade restrictions, and did not fall within the
GATT Article XX exceptions. Interpreting Article XX(b), the Panel
required the United States to show it had exhausted all other reason-
ably available options before turning to import restrictions. Accordingly,
" Id., para. 74.
45 Id., paras. 74-81.
" On the limits of warnings as a harm preventative strategy, see James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
ShellofFailure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265,307 (1990). As to an advertising ban,
the Thai government had already implemented one and wished to take more stringent
anti-smoking measures. Thai Cigarette case, supra note 43, paras. 79-80.
4 Thai Cigarette case, supra note 43, para. 55.
See id., para. 75.
, U.S.-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GAIT Doc. DS21/
R (Sept. 3, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin decision]. For a thor-
ough discussion of the Tuna-Dolphin decision, see David J. Ross, Making GATT
Dolphin-Safe: Trade and Environment, 2 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 345 (1992). See
also Christensen & Geffin, supra note 41.
" 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1990).
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the Panel found the United States should have sought a multilateral
solution, such as through treaty, since the threatened dolphins traverse
several national jurisdictions and the high seas. Importantly, the Panel
considered the multilateral option an alternative, not a complement, to
national laws. Furthermore, the Panel considered the validity of the
MMPA provisions as public policy, finding they were not "necessary"
because they were based on "unpredictable conditions.'"' Whether or
not one agrees with the Panel's characterization of the MMPA as a
policy matter, surely there is no legal basis for such an interpretation
of "necessary," which seems to depend on the Panel's ability to sec-
ond-guess the domestic rule-making process. 2
Article XX(g), dealing with conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources, has similarly strict requirements. In a dispute involving
Canada's export restrictions on unprocessed herring and salmon, a
GAIT dispute resolution panel held that measures justified under Article
XX(g) must be "primarily aimed at conservation," although they need
not be "necessary or essential."" In practice, however, the two stan-
dards merge. For instance, a recent dispute resolution Panel convened
under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FIA)l considered a
Canadian requirement that 100% of herring and salmon caught in
Canadian waters be "landed" in Canada before export, as part of a
complex fisheries management scheme.55 To determine whether the
Canadian measure was "primarily aimed at conservation," the Panel
found it necessary to examine "whether there a genuine conserva-
Tuna-Dolphin decision, supra note 49, para. 5.28.
52 The ability of unelected GATT officials to override decisions of elected lawmak-
ers in member countries is a potent source of opposition to the current shape of trade
law and institutions. See Lori Wallach & Tom Hilliard. The Consumer and Environ-
mental Case Against Fast Track 20 (May 1991) (unpublished report, Public Citizen,
Wash., D.C.).
" Unprocessed Herring case, supra note 42, para. 4.b. The dispute centered on
Canada's prohibition on the export of certain species of salmon and herring not
processed in Canada. Canada argued that while the export restrictions were not per se
conservation measures, they enhanced conservation efforts by providing a statistical
foundation for harvesting restrictions, and worked in tandem with other fish conser-
vation programs. Id., para. 4.7. The United States argued the export restrictions were
aimed at favoring domestic processors. Id., para. 3.11. The Panel rejected the
Canadian contentions, finding that the statistical and fish conservation aims of the law
could be achieved through less trade restrictive alternatives, without export restric-
tions. Id., para 4.7.
' Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988)
[hereinafter FTA]. Article 1201 of the FTA incorporates the terms of GAiT Article
XX. Id. at 352.
" Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Final
Report of the Panel, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6, para. 7.08 (Oct. 16, 1989), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File.
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tion reason for choosing the actual measure in question as opposed to
others that might accomplish the same objective."56 Only if the mea-
sure would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone would
it withstand scrutiny. Because Canada could not prove that its 100%
landing requirement was necessary on the basis of existing data, and
because the Panel found alternative ways to meet the admittedly legiti-
mate conservation objectives, it held the landing requirement violated
GATT, and therefore the FTA.
Another FTA panel decision applying Article XX(g) illustrates the
limits of this approach. While a majority of the Panel declined to reach
the issue, the minority report in the Lobster case"7 found that an an
amendment to the Magnuson Actss prohibiting the sale or transport in
or from the United States of whole live lobsters smaller than a certain
size, including those originating in foreign countries, did not come
within the strictures of Article XX(g). The Panel began by stating that
it did not require the United States to use the least trade-restrictive
method; yet it found against the United States, in part because the
Magnuson amendment had been passed "without any apparent discus-
sion of alternative enforcement methods which might be less restric-
tive on trade,"5 9 thereby importing a "least-restrictive" requirement into
the language of XX(g). Next, the Panel considered the legislative his-
tory of the amendment. It found statements underscoring the conser-
vation rationale for the measure, but also statements of concern for the
trade in undersized lobsters. These statements merely pointed out the
obvious: U.S. lobster fishers were at a competitive disadvantage because
they were subject to more stringent conservation regulations than the
56 Id. at 30.
"' Lobsters from Canada, Final Report of the Panel, USA 89-1807-01, 1990 FTAPD
LEXIS 11, pt. 9 (May 25, 1990), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File
[hereinafter Lobster case]. The dispute between the majority and minority members of
the panel centered on whether the ban on the sale of undersized lobsters was a
quantitative restriction under Article XI (minority view) or an internal regulation
under Article IIl (majority view) subject only to the national treatment requirements
of Article III. Because the majority did not find the existence of a quantitative
restriction, and because discrimination against foreign producers under Article III was
outside the panel's terms of reference, the majority did not reach the Article XX issue.
Id., paras. 2.6, 11.2.1, 11.3.2. Thus, while the discussion of Article XX is not part of
the official panel holding, it is an indication of how similar panels might analyze the
issue in the future.
"' Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), 16 U.S.C. §
1857 (1)(J), as amended by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Ocean
Coastal Programs Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-224, § 8, 103 Stat. 1905, 1907
(1989).
59 Lobster case, supra note 57, paras. 9.4.2, 9.6.2.
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Canadians.' Thus, the Panel concluded that the objectives of the
amendment were both of a conservation nature and a trade restriction.
Given that the burden of proof was on the United States, the United
States "had not made their case strongly enough to lead ... members
to the conclusion that the measures were primarily aimed at conserva-
tion."61
Additionally, to come within the coverage of Article XX(g), the trade
restriction must be imposed in conjunction with restrictions on domes-
tic production or consumption.62 This excludes cases where there is no
domestic production or consumption, or where the restricted resource
differs from that being conserved. For example, in a 1982 dispute
involving U.S. import restrictions on Canadian tuna, 3 a GA'TT Panel
found Article XX did not apply because there were no restrictions on
domestic tuna consumption and the restrictions on production did not
extend to all kinds of tuna from Canada.
It is true that health and environmental regulations can be used in a
discriminatory or protectionist fashion to bar goods from certain coun-
tries or to protect domestic interests. Southern countries" are especially
worried that such regulations will be used to deny them access to the
valuable markets of larger industrialized nations.' However, these le-
gitimate concerns can be addressed without second-guessing domestic
6 This is generally true where commercial competitors face differing environmen-
tal regulations. See infra pt. III.C.
" Lobster case, supra note 57, para. 9.9.1.
This requirement has been interpreted to mean that a regulation affecting imports
or exports must be "primarily aimed at rendering effective these [domestic] restric-
tions." Unprocessed Herring case, supra note 42, at 30 (emphasis added).
"3 United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
Report of the Panel, B.I.S.D. 29S/108 (Feb. 22, 1982).
" Throughout this article, I refer to Southern countries rather than "developing" or
"less developed" countries. I am well aware that the term is geographically inaccu-
rate, but the alternatives are even less satisfactory. References to "developing" imply
that the "developed" have arrived at some predefined and desirable goal while the
"developing" are still trying to get there. The collapse of the "second world" Eastern
Bloc makes "third world" an anachronism. Hence my resort to "Southern."
' Southern countries have long pushed for opening the markets of OECD countries
to their products, especially natural resource-based products and textiles. Industrial-
ized nations have protected their own natural resource and textile sectors through such
devices as tariff escalation and creation of the Multifibre Agreement. See UNCED
UrmeD, supra note 3, at 6 n.24. Thus, it is not surprising that Southern countries
would be suspicious of non-tariff barriers to their imports imposed by industrialized
nations. See, e.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, GATT Doc. C/M/247, Agenda
Item 10 (Feb. 5, 1991) (opposition to reactivation of the GATT' Working Group on the
Environment: Tanzanian delegate expressed concern that international trading system
will impose conservation costs on primary commodity producers without remunera-
tion; Thai and Moroccan delegates stated misgivings about injecting environmental
issues into GATT).
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policy choices.'
Rather than treating such regulations as an exception, trade agreements
should state positively that health, safety, conservation, and environ-
mental regulations are allowed even if they have trade-restricting ef-
fects, unless they violate certain conditions. The requirement that such
regulations may not discriminate arbitrarily among countries provides
one important safeguard against abuse. So too does the stipulation that
the measures not be intended as disguised restrictions on trade, with-
out any environmental justification.67 Incidental effects on trade, or a
mixed set of motives for establishing a restriction, 68 should not be
enough to overcome a presumption of validity, although major inciden-
tal effects may of course constitute evidence of protectionist intent. The
fact that domestic industry, if it exists, is treated significantly more
leniently than imports could similarly evidence a protectionist intent.
But as long as a policy choice serves a legitimate purpose and does not
arbitrarily discriminate, the fact that a dispute resolution panel believes
other methods would be superior, or even equivalent, should not matter.
Through trade rules, we may choose to privilege either commercial
benefit or the environment, while taking both into account. The start-
ing point from which we balance these often conflicting interests will
frequently determine the outcome. By shifting the burden of proof and
making measures aimed at environmental, human health, and consumer
protection presumptively valid, trade agreements can be brought into
line with precautionary principles of environmental protection.
" In contrast to GATT' Article XX, Article XXI, dealing with national security,
leaves the interpretation of what consbitutes national security entirely to the contract-
ing party invoking the exception. The security exception, too, may be used in ways
considered protectionist, see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT
752 (1969), yet the broad discretion given national governments under Article XXI to
decide what is a proper subject for application of that exception contrasts sharply with
the strict interpretation under Articles XX(b) and (g). For example, in 1986 a GATI
panel declined to consider a Nicaraguan complaint that a U.S. trade embargo violated
GATT, citing the broad discretion allowed under Article XXI. See Latin America:
Embargo on Nicaragua Did Not Violate Obligations Under GATT, Dispute Panel
Rules, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1368-69 (Nov. 12, 1986) (summarizing unadopted
GATT panel report).
" There are, of course, inherent difficulties in ascertaining legislative or
regulatory intent, but it remains a valid tool for decisionmaking. See, e.g., Nicholas
S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 C ARDOzo
L. REV. 1597 (1991) (analyzing approaches of legal process, practical reasoning,
textualist, and other methods of ascertaining legislative intent).
" Domestic legislation is often promoted by alliances of groups with very different
motivations. The fact that environmentally sound laws are supported by lawmakers
more interested in their constituents' competitive advantage should not make such
laws invalid.
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D. Harmonization and the Quantum of Proof
A third aspect of the precautionary principle concerns the quantum
of proof required for action: in the face of limited scientific evidence,
the threat of environmental degradation is enough to justify regulation,
even without proof of a causal link between emissions and harm.69 This
facet is relevant to the determination of the appropriate scientific basis
for health- or environment-based legislation. The dispute between the
United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) over use
of Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH), for instance, turns in part on an
EEC determination that BGH in beef may have unwanted effects on
health, while the United States argues there is an insufficient scientific
basis for this determination.70
Current efforts to harmonize food safety standards have also raised
the issue of what constitutes an acceptable scientific basis for regula-
tion. The draft Uruguay Round GATT agreement contains language that
appears to prohibit technical and food safety standards which exceed
those set by international bodies, unless the standards are supported by
scientific consensus. 71 The country with the stricter standards bears the
burden of showing that the standards are scientifically justified or meet
specified risk assessment criteria.7 The flaw in this approach is that
unanimous scientific agreement on the level of risk a society should
See generally Hey, supra note 18.
0 See John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment
for International Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK. LrrnLE ROcK L.J. 430,
435 (1992). The United States sought to resolve the issue under the dispute settlement
mechanism of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code), while
the EEC preferred GAT itself as the forum. The dispute is still pending. Id.
" The draft text requires standards for pesticide residues, food additives, and the
like to be "based on scientific principles and not maintained against available scientific
evidence." Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, at L.36, para. 6, GAT7 Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20,
1991) [hereinafter Dunkel text].
I The risk assessment procedures mandate that parties take into account
economic factors, including the "relative cost-effectiveness of alternative
approaches to limiting risks," as well as "the objective of minimizing negative trade
effects." Id. In addition, parties must justify cases where they apply different levels
of protection in different situations. Id. Some observers have noted these provisions
appear to be aimed at the Delaney Clause of the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 348 (c)(3)(A), 376 (b) (5) (B) (1988), which mandates that processed foods
may not be sold with any amount of residue of pesticides or additives known to be
carcinogenic. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992) (overturning EPA
interpretation of Delaney Clause allowing "de minimis" carcinogenic residues);
Memorandum from Lori Wallach, on Dunkel Draft (Public Citizen, Wash., D.C., Dec.
1991).
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tolerate is impossible.73 These decisions are political and social, not
scientific. By relying so heavily on scientific consensus, this aspect of
the harmonization provisions violates the precautionary principle.
II
CLEAN PRODUCTION: PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS
One of the corollaries of the precautionary principle is that the surest
way to avoid environmental risks is through clean production method-
ologies. Rather than relying on measures which disperse, filter, or
dispose of pollutants after they are produced, clean production systems
avoid using or creating hazardous products and wastes, do not use
hazardous processes, and use a minimal amount of raw materials, water,
and energy.74 For example, in agriculture, clean production focuses on
limiting the use of chemical inputs. Such an approach was adopted in
the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
preparatory meetings7 5 and by participants in the London Dumping
Convention.7 6
The question then becomes how to encourage a shift to clean pro-
duction methods. Doing so requires a new focus on how things are
produced, not just on disposal of production by-products. It may in-
clude discouraging or prohibiting the use of certain production inputs,
such as hazardous chemicals, or requiring redesign of production or har-
vesting facilities. It may also involve making disposal of hazardous ma-
"I Of course, these provisions could be interpreted merely to require some level of
scientific backing, rather than unanimity. If this is a proper interpretation, the wording
should be clarified. Even that interpretation, however, would thwart legitimate food
safety or environmental measures taken for reasons other than science, such as
maintaining family farms or satisfying consumer preference.
74 See GREENPEACE INT'L, supra note 26, at 3.
" See, e.g., Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development (Agenda
21), U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/L.3/Add.9 (1992) (supporting promotion of less pollut-
ing and more efficient technologies and processes in industries); U.N. Doc. Al
CONF.151/4 pt. II, at 140 (1992) (precautionary and anticipatory approach to prevent-
ing degradation of marine environment requires, inter alia, clean production tech-
niques).
76 A German submission to the Convention is illustrative:
Emission standards alone also cannot prevent insidious alterations. But precau-
tionary action which adapts these standards to technical means and thereby leads
to techniques of recycling, reduction and avoidance of wastes can help to reduce
... the probability of insidious alternations which otherwise could lead to drastic
events. Precautionary action thus means solving technical and economical prob-
lems.
London Dumping Convention, LDC/SG 13/8/1, cited in Andre Nollkaemper, The
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 22 MARqE POLLtnION
BULL. 107, 109 (1991).
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terials or by-products difficult and costly enough that producers seek
safer alternatives. A move to clean production will require differentia-
tion of products based not only on their end-uses, but also on how they
are produced. From an environmental point of view, it makes a differ-
ence whether or not tuna is caught by "setting" on dolphins.7 Simi-
larly, it matters whether fish are caught with driftnets which indiscrimi-
nately kill many other forms of sea life, whether timber is sustainably
harvested or destructively clearcut, or whether computer chips are made
using solvents that destroy the ozone layer or with water-based solvents.
Unfortunately, the language and interpretations of current trade agree-
ments make the move to clean production more difficult. GATT inter-
pretations have characterized goods as "like products" based on whether
they have "substantially identical end-uses," without regard to how they
are produced. Thus, under GAIT law, tuna is tuna, wood is wood, and
chips are chips. 78
The most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions of GATT Article I make
clear that barriers raised and incentives granted to exports from one
country must be equally applied to all other countries. Thus, if a coun-
try wishes to encourage more sustainable production methods or dis-
courage destructive ones, it cannot do so by favoring imports from
countries whose producers employ the more environmentally sound
practices. 79 Nor can it, under current rules, limit, tax, or prohibit im-
ports from countries where a lack of health and environmental regu-
lation allows goods to be produced more cheaply, even if such imports
undercut domestic producers who must comply with such regulations.'
Finally, under GATT rules, a country cannot use its trade leverage to
provide incentives for other countries to stop environmentally destruc-
tive activities, for instance by denying access to its markets in related
goods.8' Thus, if GATT is not to be an impediment to the switch to
" Because yellowfin tuna often travel with dolphins, fishermen sight the dolphins
and set nets above them to capture the tuna. The dolphins get caught in the nets and drown.
I See Case L/6175, Re Superfund Taxes: EEC and Others v. United States, 3
C.M.L.R. 605 (1988) (GATT).
7 Current GATT rules permit countries to ban imports of products which are in
themselves dangerous or damaging to the environment so long as domestic production
is similarly curtailed, but they do not permit countries to ban goods solely because they
are produced in an unsound manner. GATT, supra note 11, art. I.
, See infra pt. Ill. C.
" For example, U.S. law allows the President to suspend other countries' fishing
rights in the 200-mile U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) when that country
undermines the effectiveness of a fishing or whale conservation agreement. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(2) (1985) (Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act). The President may also embargo wildlife product
imports when a country diminishes the effectiveness of a conservation program for
fisheries or endangered or threatened species. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (Supp. 1992) (Pelly
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clean production, the definition of "like product" must be changed to
take into account a product's impact on the environment.
The alternative is to differentiate on the basis not of countries, but
of producers. That is, rather than focus on whether the government of
State A provides a regulatory environment which encourages environ-
mentally destructive production, the focus would be directly on the
producer. Goods which, in themselves or because of their production
or extraction processes, harm the environment would be prohibited or
restricted, while those using more sustainable processes would be al-
lowed entry, or even granted tariff concessions.
Nothing in the language of GATT precludes this approach, and it is
consistent with the MFN and national treatment requirements.8 2 In
addition, historical precedents exist for this proposal: a 1906 treaty
prohibited the production and importation of matches made using white
phosphorus because of the effects of the production process on work-
ers."3 Another regional convention prohibited trade in fish caught by
methods having "an injurious effect upon the spawning and preserva-
tion" of fisheries."
Nonetheless, production process-based differentiation was explicitly
ruled out by the GATT Panel in the Tuna-Dolphin decision."' The Panel
considered whether a U.S. regulation requiring an embargo on tuna
caught by setting purse seines on dolphin came within the provisions
of Article III:4, which permits regulations which apply to both imports
and like domestic products to be enforced at the point of importation.
Under the Panel's interpretation of Article Il1, internal regulations are
allowed only if they do not afford special protection to domestic industry,
Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act). The threat of trade retaliation against
all natural resource products helped convince the Japanese to pass laws prohibiting the
killing of endangered hawk-billed turtles. See Japan: Dolphin's Day, ECONoMIST,
Nov. 30, 1991, at 34. These tactics would likely be invalidated in a GATT challenge
under the Dunkel text language.
82 At least facially, such requirements would apply to both domestic and imported
goods. However, foreign producers could still challenge such production-based
requirements as having a disparate effect on them, as in cases where there was no
equivalent domestic production (e.g., tropical timber). Problems could also arise
regarding goods produced only in one or a very few countries. In these situations,
producer-based restrictions could be viewed as a form of disguised discrimination.
S3 Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX,
J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37, 39 (1991) (citing 203 C.T.S. 13). Ample historical
evidence exists that the drafters of Article XX intended to give it broad scope, covering
processes as well as products and allowing extraterritorial protection of common
global resources. Id. at 52. Unfortunately, subsequent interpretations have departed
from that original understanding. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
' Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 39-40 (citing 19 L.N.T.S. 49-51 & 82 L.N.T.S.
275).
" See Tuna-Dolphin decision, supra note 49.
HeinOnline -- 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 75 1992
76 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION
and taxes, laws, and regulations may be imposed as "border tax adjust-
ments" only so long as they are levied directly on the product at is-
sue.8s According to the Panel, the regulations at issue "could not be
regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because they would
not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna
as a product." 87 The Panel held the regulations were not levied directly
on tuna within the meaning of Article III, and could therefore not be
considered a permissible internal regulation rather than an impermis-
sible import prohibition.8
Any move towards clean production requires an ability to distinguish
between goods made in an environmentally sound manner and those which
are destructive. The Tuna-Dolphin decision precludes that possibility. It
is becoming possible to identify cases where clearly environmentally
superior production methods and clearly destructive ones coexist for the
same products; the tuna, timber, and semiconductor chip examples cited
above illustrate this point. Other examples of harmful processes or prod-
uct constituents include those using asbestos, mercury, chlorine, or
leaded gas. Further down the road, nuclear or fossil-fuel generated
processes might be included in the same category. As these cases are
identified, the trade system should take account of the differences.
Countries should be able to identify two different types of imports: those
made using environmentally destructive methods, and those made by
more environmentally sound means.8 9 Differential tariffs, and if nec-
essary, quotas or prohibitions, should then be allowed on these goods.9°
This would allow the trade system to move from creating ecologically
inappropriate incentives to implementing environmentally sound ones.
" Id., para. 5.13 (citing GAIT Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments
100-01, B.I.S.D. 18S/97).
Id., para. 5.14.
I d., paras. 5.9-5.14.
" Indeed, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel seemed to foreshadow this approach in its
treatment of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. The Act prevents
fraudulent labeling of tuna as "dolphin-safe" by according the right to use that label for
tuna harvested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) only if accompanied by documen-
tary evidence that it was not harvested with purse seine nets intentionally deployed to
encircle dolphins. In response to Mexico's complaint of discriminatory treatment, the
Panel found the Act consistent with the MFN obligation because the regulations
governing tuna caught in the ETP did not distinguish between products originating in
Mexico and products originating in other countries.
" Implementation of such a system need not be as administratively daunting as it
might seem. Private or publicly-run labeling or certification systems would facilitate
the task and could be self-financing. The number and types of processes or inputs
subject to these provisions would depend on clearly delineated guidelines; in this
respect, the proposal differs from the compensatory environmental tariff scheme
discussed later in this article. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. Once
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Another incentive to clean production will arise if unsound produc-
tion processes become more costly, thereby making the necessary
investments in new methods more cost-effective. For industrial
producers, one area of concern is disposal of the by-products of pro-
duction, especially hazardous wastes. If such wastes can be disposed
of quickly and at little apparent cost, little incentive exists to minimize
waste generation. As costs of disposing of hazardous substances and
wastes have risen in OECD countries, producers have begun exporting
wastes to less industrialized countries, where disposal costs are lower
and fewer regulatory controls exist. In addition to lower costs, disposal
abroad reduces the political and social pressure on producers to "clean
up their act," as the public health and environmental effects of the toxic
wastes are felt far away, outside the scrutiny of the domestic political
system.
Several factors, including these disincentives to clean production, have
spurred attempts to limit or stop trade in hazardous wastes.9 Those
efforts, however, are threatened by the current rules of free trade. For
example, the Bamako Convention92 prohibits imports of hazardous
waste into Africa, while allowing trade in waste by African countries,
subject to stringent notification procedures. Because the Convention al-
lows domestic waste producers to continue disposing of wastes while
prohibiting imports, it violates both the national treatment and quan-
titative restriction provisions of GAT. In addition, by differentiating
between African and non-African countries, the Convention violates the
MFN clause. Even the much less stringent Basel Convention,93 which
allows countries to ban the entry or disposal of foreign wastes, may
these guidelines were identified, tariffs could be set through the normal processes of
tariff setting and binding, using the existing harmonized system of tariff categories to
distinguish between products based on the different processes involved. For example,
"computer chip, CFC-solvent cleaned," would be a different good from "computer
chip, water cleaned."
Whether a prohibition is required, rather than a tariff, depends on the severity of the
environmental problem, theprice elasticity of the good in question, information on and
access to substitutes, and a number of other factors. In many cases, only a flat ban will
provide the necessary incentives for a switch-over. Of course, this would require
changes in current Article XI prohibitions on quantitative restrictions. In addition,
product bans raise difficult questions of timing: a grace period for switching over may
be necessary, but to avoid producers simply intensifying destructive practices during
this period, interim quotas would have to be imposed.
9" See Bamako Convention, supra note 25, pmbl.
92 Id.
" Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.80/3, 28
I.L.M. 649 (entered into force Feb. 1992).
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well violate the same GAITT provisions."
Even laws limiting waste trade on a national level may run into
problems. It makes sense, from an environmental viewpoint, to distin-
guish between national producers, who are subject to national social
and political pressure to reduce their waste, and foreign producers, who
avoid both this pressure and the presumably higher costs of disposing
the waste in their own countries. Nonetheless, attempts to ban foreign
waste have been challenged as unwarranted and protectionist barriers
to the free flow of goods.
In a case recently decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ),91
the European Commission and the Advocate-General argued that an
attempt by the Belgian region of Wallonia to prohibit waste imports
unlawfully discriminated against foreign waste producers. 96 The Com-
mission argued that Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, protecting the
free movement of goods and prohibiting quantitative restrictions on
imports, meant that Wallonia could not restrict the entrance of waste
"goods."'
The ECJ, fortunately, rejected this expansive interpretation, holding
that under an exception to the free trade imperative of Article 30,
governments can restrict trade for environmental purposes. Restricting
waste imports is not per se discriminatory, due to the special, poten-
tially dangerous nature of waste, although it might incidentally favor
local producers. To this extent, the ECJ established a much more en-
9 Of course, the regulating state, if challenged under GATT, could argue that
Article XX(b) provides an exception to the rules for measures that protect human
health. However, as discussed above, the burden would be on the regulating state to
show an import ban was necessary and that no less trade-restrictive approach (for
example, better handling of wastes) was available.
" Case 2/90. Commission v. Belgium (July 9, 1992) (not yet published; see
summary in 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 462 (1992)).
9 The state government enacted the ban in response to reports of health care
problems among the populace of Mellery, site of a large dump receiving wastes from
Germany and the Netherlands, among others. See David Gardner, EC Court Refuses
to Block Toxic Waste, FiN. TumEs, July 10, 1992, at 3.
91 The ECJ had previously considered the interplay between free movement of
goods and protection of the environment. In a 1988 case, the ECJ recognized that laws
aimed at protecting the environment are an allowed exception to Article 30. Case 302/
86, Commission v. Denmark (In Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
Nonetheless, while the ECJ upheld part of a Danish law mandating recycling of bottles
and cans, it struck down the more environmentally beneficial reuse provisions because
they would unduly burden importers.
Recycling and reuse laws have generated trade disputes in other contexts. The
United States has recently accused Canada of violating GATT because of an Ontario
10 centper can levy on beer cans. Returnable bottles are exempt from the levy. Because
most U.S. beer is sold in cans, while Canadian beer comes mostly in bottles, the United
States argues the levy is discriminatory. US. Seeks Retaliation in GATT Against
Canadian Beer Restrictions, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1204 (July 15, 1992).
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vironmentally sensitive rule than that of GAIT."
However, the ECJ followed this positive general statement with a less
positive application. Because an EEC directive" had already set up
notification and monitoring procedures for hazardous wastes, the ECJ
held Wallonia could not go beyond the directive, but could only try to
convince the Commission to strengthen it. The ironic result is that
Wallonia may ban all imports of non-hazardous waste, but may not ban
the more dangerous waste covered by the directive because to do so
would conflict with the harmonization intended by the directive. De-
spite the limited nature and spotty implementation of the directives,'0°
EC law prohibits member states from shoring up their own waste
programs. The next section explores this tension between global or
regional agreements and national solutions.
III
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
MULTILATERALISM, AND NATIONAL LAWS
Parts I and II of this article explored how the present GATT rules
conflict with a precautionary approach. Another set of trade-related
problems involves the application of precautionary principles to the goal
of global regulation, in light of current international economic, envi-
The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, has held that states may not close their
landfills to out-of-state waste, because doing so violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Unlike the GAI or EC
cases, however, in the United States a popularly elected Congress may establish
uniform national rules overriding such a holding in order to promote waste reduction.
The Senate has recently done just that. See Keith Schneider, Senate Approves Bill
Curbing Interstate Garbage Shipments, N.Y. TPMEs, July 24, 1992. at A16.
" Two directives were at issue. The ECJ found that Wallonia had not run afoul of
a 1975 Directive on waste, Council Directive 75/442. which did not specifically deal
with trade in wastes. On the other hand, the 1984 Council Directive 86/631 (amended
by Directives 86/279 and 87/112), while permitting an importing country to refuse a
specific shipment of waste for environmental or health reasons and setting out
notification procedures, does not permit a total ban on waste imports. The court ruled
that Wallonia's action was an impermissible step beyond the latter directive.
10, The directives take effect only when incorporated into national laws, and have
been poorly implemented. See Patrick Thieffry & Peter Nahmias, The European
Community's Regulation and Control of Waste and the Adoption of Civil Liability, 14
HAsr"mos INT'L & Comp. L. Rev. 949,962 (1991); Marguerite M. Cusack, International
Law and the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste to the Third World: Will
the Basel Convention Make a Difference, 5 Am. U. J. INr'L L. & Poty 393, 404-05
(1990). Only Greece, Belgium, and Denmark have incorporated the directives into
national law. Cusack, supra, at 404-05. Although the 1984 Directive was amended in
1986 to require prior informed consent for exports, id. at404, a promised new directive
has not yet been approved. Thieffry & Namias, supra, at 963.
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ronmental, and political realities. Underlying the conflict between trade
rules and environmental principles is a pervasive contradiction: the
globalization of both economic life and ecological problems has not
been accompanied by a corresponding globalization of regulatory and
political institutions and accountability mechanisms. A precautionary
approach, recognizing this gap, would strengthen existing regulatory
structures while attempting to build new, global ones. In reality, trade
rules opt for inaction. By making national and sub-national regulation
over environmental problems more difficult, GAT rules and decisions
undermine the most effective levels of regulation. While purporting to
promote a high-minded multinational ism, in effect GATT doctrine
leaves the global economy with no effective environmental regulation.
GATT's treatment of export restrictions, "extraterritorial" measures, and
compensatory tariffs for conservation purposes illustrate the problem.
A. Export Bans
Sovereignty over natural resources is an oft-repeated principle of
international law,'0 ' and there is, to date, no global authority empow-
ered to promote the conservation of global resources. Only in very
specific areas, such as endangered species, have any inroads been
made.1°2 As a result, the principal responsibility for conservation of
resources within national boundaries lies with national governments.
Yet GATT rules make it more difficult for states to make the choices
necessary to control the rate at which they exploit their resources.
As discussed above, GAIT Article XI prohibits most quantitative
restrictions, including quotas and export bans. 13 Export bans have been
01 See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, Principle 21; Rio Declaration,
supra note 7, Principle 2; see also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/
9631, 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
102 See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES]. CITES provides a modicum of international regulation of trade in
endangered species, but has been widely criticized as ineffective. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1990); William C. Burns, CITES and the Regulation of International
Trade in Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical Appraisal, 8 DICK. J. rINr'L L. 203
(1990).
1*03 Article XI reads: "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on [imports or
exports]." GAIT, supra note 11, art. XI. GAT provides exceptions for temporary
shortages of foodstuffs or other essential products, for the classification or grading of
commodities, and for agricultural and fisheries products under certain narrow circum-
stances. Id.
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employed most notably in the forest sector, where countries like Indo-
nesia, the Philippines, and several states or provinces of Malaysia,
Canada, and the United States have banned exports of raw logs, requir-
ing domestic processing.1°4 These bans have been justified as conser-
vation measures, among other reasons. Yet Japan has challenged the
Indonesian ban under GATIT, 01 and a British Columbia ban is the
subject of a U.S. International Trade Commission dispute."
From a trade perspective, a unilateral export ban on a natural
resource is illegitimate because it protects a domestic industry which
uses the same resources. The product becomes cheaper on the domes-
tic market as supplies rise, and more expensive on the international
market as global supplies decline. As a result, foreign producers bear
the brunt of the effect of export curbs, while domestic producers
benefit.
Yet such restrictions may be legitimate and necessary parts of resource
conservation strategies. For example, one of the main obstacles to forest
conservation is a perception by local populations that mill jobs will be
lost if logging is restricted."° By requiring local processing of timber,
with a higher value-added content than raw logs, jobs and income can
be preserved with a much smaller number of trees cut. Similarly, for
Southern countries, local processing can reduce pressure on the sen-
sitive tropical forest resource base, while allowing continuing genera-
tion of foreign exchange.1°
, 4 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 489(a), 620 (a),(c),(e) (Supp. 11990) (U.S. law banning
raw log exports). See generally ROBERT GLlus & MALcotm RErro, Puauc POLICIES
AND THE MIsusE OF FOREST REisoucREs (1988). The export ban issue also arises in regard
to exports of domestically restricted or prohibited pesticides. If the export ban is
justified because the pesticide will be reimported as residue on food imports (the
"circle of poison" argument), it could arguably be allowed under GATF Article XX(b).
But if pesticide exports are banned because they kill fish or wildlife or poison
farmworkers or consumers in the importing country, such a ban would be prohibited
as a quantitative restriction affecting resources outside the regulating state's jurisdic-
tion. See infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text, discussing extraterritorial appli-
cation of conservation measures.
"* See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Environment Versus Freer Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11,
1991, at D4.
106 See 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 431 (Mar. 11, 1992).
1" In the Pacific Northwest, where litigation involving the spotted owl has tied up
timber sales in old growth forests, many feel that the decline in timber-related jobs is
a direct result of restricted harvesting plans. See, e.g, Jeff Mapes, President Takes Up
Cry On Owls, OREGONIAN, Sept. 15, 1992, at Al.
"Os Tariff escalation (imposing higher tariffs on processed goods than on raw
materials) by Northern countries has slowed the development of natural resources
processing industries as an income-generating strategy in Southern nations. Thus, one
of the aims of Southern countries in trade negotiations has been to reduce or eliminate
tariff escalation, and to expand Northern markets for Southern wood products.
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Of course, a shift to local processing of timber will not necessarily
conserve resources. On the contrary, without an accompanying decrease
in logging, it may well have the opposite effect.109 But simply prohib-
iting or reducing logging may create such severe social and economic
dislocation that it is politically unwise and thus virtually impossible.
Moreover, governments may want to allow enough logging to meet
domestic construction needs, and simply reducing the permitted cut may
result in timber being channelled into the more lucrative export mar-
ket, creating domestic shortages or unacceptable price hikes. Current
GATT rules impose on governments a Hobson's choice of no action
or politically infeasible action, and the result will often be the defeat
of conservation measures.
10
B. Import Restrictions and Extraterritoriality
The tension between creating multilateral solutions to global envi-
ronmental problems and simultaneously maintaining local regulatory au-
thority is most troublesome in the extraterritorial application of a
nation's environmental or conservation laws. As discussed above, the
import restrictions allowed by current trade laws are quite limited. For
instance, the GATT Tuna-Dolphin decision held the Article XX excep-
tions relate only to resources within the jurisdiction of the regulating
state,"' although neither the text nor the legislative history of GAIT
impose any such restriction."2 Since the U.S. import restrictions on tuna
were designed to affect resources outside U.S. jurisdiction, the Panel
held they did not fit within the Article XX exception. If states could
impose restrictions aimed at protecting resources in other states or in
the global commons, the Panel reasoned, "each contracting party could
unilaterally determine the conservation policies from which other
contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights
"' For example, in Indonesia, prohibitions on raw log exports, combined with
incentives to local plywood producers, may have accelerated deforestation, as cuts
were increased to feed new, inefficient mills producing cheap plywood for export. See
Malcolm Gillis, Indonesia: Public Policies, Resource Management and the Tropical
Forest 43, 71, in Gnus & REPTrO, supra note 104.
"o Of course, Article XX(g) should allow countries to override the limits on export
restrictions in order to conserve renewable natural resources. But, as discussed above,
Article XX has been construed so narrowly as to be nearly useless.
Tuna-Dolphin decision, supra note 49, paras. 5.27, 5.32.
112 On the contrary, at the time Article XX of GATT was drafted several treaties and
national laws existed protecting resources located outside the regulating state's
jurisdiction. The drafters rejected language that would have limited Article XX's
extraterritorial application. See Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 43-46.
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under [GAIT]. '113
The Panel's reasoning ignores the connections between most envi-
ronmental problems, in which measures to protect the oceans, atmo-
sphere, or species outside national jurisdiction are required to protect
a country's own marine, atmospheric, or genetic resources."" Not only
does it jeopardize the trade-related provisions of several international
environmental agreements, it also ignores the strength of local prefer-
ences, the need for quick action to avoid ecological disaster, and the
interplay between national and international decisionmaking.
Several environmental agreements include provisions restricting trade
among parties, as well as between parties and nonparties. These agree-
ments include the Montreal Protocol on Depletion of the Ozone Layer,
115
the Basel Convention on Trade in Hazardous Wastes,", and the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),' all
of which concern resources located in whole or in part outside the ju-
risdiction of the restricting states."' Under the restrictive jurisdictional
0 Tuna-Dolphin decision, supra note 49, paras. 5.27, 5.32. Similarly, the GAIT
Secretariat, in its recent Trade and Environment paper, differentiates between environ-
mental problems with "physical" spillover effects and cases with only "psychological"
spillovers. According to the Secretariat, the former should be dealt with through
multilateral solutions, while the latter, because there is no physical effect in another
country, constitute purely domestic problems. These include preservation of endan-
gered species or an end to inhumane or unsound production processes. The Secretariat
fears that allowing states to take trade measures to affect these problems will open a
"Pandora's box" of attempts to control other countries' policies through trade, and that
national laws restricting trade based on extraterritorial problems must therefore be
banned. Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 24, 27-31 & n.29.
"" Even the most localized types of pollution have regional or global effects.
Burning fossil fuels not only causes localized air pollution and transboundary acid rain
problems, but adds to the global warming which affects all countries. See Gary E.
Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global
Warming, 22 ENvYn_. L. 623 (1992). Aquatic runoff from agricultural and industrial
activities contains pollutants which accumulate in the oceans and in marine life, and
one country's toxic wastes may well end up embedded in the global food chain. Also,
species extinction in one country reduces global biodiversity. Indeed, considering the
holistic interactions of the planet's natural systems, it is difficult to think of instances
of purely localized environmental impacts.
" Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
116 Basel Convention, supra note 93.
"7 CITES, supra note 102.
.. The Montreal Protocol restricts production and trade in chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) to reduce the current threat to the global ozone layer; the Basel Convention
limits waste trade in order to protect the environment of countries outside the waste
exporter's territory; CITES protects endangered species outside an importer's juris-
diction. Significantly, each of these agreements also conflict with the MFN provisions
of Article I of GAIT, by differentiating between parties and non-parties. For a full
discussion of these conflicts, see Joan E. Donohugue, The Trade Provisions of
International Environment Agreements: Can They be Reconciled with the GATTZ 86
PRoc. Am. Soc. Irr'L L. 233 (forthcoming Jan. 1993).
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analysis of the Tuna-Dolphin decision, a country which is a party to
GATT but not to the environmental agreements could challenge these
agreements, and the party restricting trade could be found to violate
GAIT." 9 Nevertheless, because many powerful parties to GATT are
also parties to these environmental agreements, pressure is building for
either a general or specific waiver of GATT's applicability, or an
amendment specifying that international environmental agreements are
exempt from GAIT.1
A more difficult issue is the use of trade measures to affect resources
outside the regulating state's jurisdiction in the absence of a multilat-
eral agreement. The Tuna-Dolphin decision, the GATT Secretariat, and
even the Rio Declaration of the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development have decried the use of unilateral trade measures to protect
the global environment, while embracing the idea of multilateral ef-
forts. 21 But framing the issue as impermissible unilateral measures
versus permitted multilateral ones ignores the reality of current mul-
tilateral rulemaking.
First, although a multilateral approach has clear advantages in build-
ing cooperation and ensuring agreed-upon standards, national action
may be more effective because it can be implemented more quickly and
enforced more easily. Multilateral environmental lawmaking suffers
from a host of problems, stemming principally from a need to include
a large number of states to make a regime effective, while achieving
consensus among these states.' a To compound the problem, the inter-
national environmental lawmaking system is incapable of binding states
119 Since a challenge would come from countries not party to the environmental
agreement, building language into environmental agreements by which parties waive
their rights under GATT would be ineffective.
2'0 See Eliza Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional
Solutions, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,599, 10,601 (Oct. 1991).
I The GAT Secretariat's newfound enthusiasm for multilateral measures ignores
the Tuna-Dolphin decision's implications for existing multilateral agreements. See
supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
'22 There are, of course, regional or species-based problems which can best
be resolved by smaller groups of states. But global problems, such as ozone
depletion, biodiversity, global warming, and marine pollution, require a large
number of parties to effectively attack the problem, to avoid non-parties "free-riding"
on the efforts of others, and to provide international legitimacy to protection efforts.
See Donohugue, supra note 118, at 233-380. Suggestions for overcoming the limits
of a consensus-based model include a global environmental agency, or a model based
on the International Labor Organization, where industry, states, and non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) jointly define binding standards and policies. See Geoffrey
Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259
(1992).
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that choose not to enter into agreements.1 23 Thus, progress to date has
been uncertain and slow, and a single recalcitrant state may block
advances or pull standards down to a lowest common denominator.'2
Unfortunately, many current environmental problems are too urgent to
await the outcome of this cumbersome process.
At the same time, drawing a bright line between unilateral and mul-
tilateral efforts to deal with global environmental problems ignores the
dynamic between national and international regulation. Often the ex-
ample and moral pressure of unilateral action or the threat of unilateral
sanctions accelerate the process of international lawmaking. A case in
point is the Montreal Protocol. When negotiations to cut back levels
of CFC production stalled in 1987 due to opposition from industry and
the European Community, Senators Chafee of Rhode Island and Baucus
of Montana introduced legislation which would have banned the im-
port of products made with or containing CFCs.125 The Senators, like
the U.S. negotiators, understood that the threat of unilateral action would
help accelerate conclusion of a treaty. The result was a change in the
industry and EC positions, which led to the prompt conclusion of an
agreement setting out a timetable for cuts in CFC production." Simi-
larly, the passage of U.S. legislation to protect endangered species
probably helped secure the 1973 passage of CITES.
127
121 Laws based on international custom and usage, which can bind states without
written agreement, have seldom been applied in the area of environmental protection,
with the possible exception of the general principles of avoidance of harm, compen-
sation, and information sharing. See generally Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 32; Palmer,
supra note 122. Nor have environmental law principles been considered jus cogens
(binding on all states by virtue of their existence as states and therefore superseding
any contrary treaty provision). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREION RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNIED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) (listing provisions of international law
considered jus cogens).
124 See Palmer, supra note 122, at 259-64; see also Steven J. Shimberg, A Review of
Major Provisions: Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic Legisla-
tion and the International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175 (1991) (Montreal Protocol a
"major half-step forward" that does not go far enough); David P. Hackett, An
Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 Am. U. J. INrr'L L. & PoL'Y 291, 313-23
(1990) (discussing vagueness and enforcement problems in convention); Cusack,
supra note 100, at 417-20.
I" S. 570, S. 571, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), cited in Peter M. Haas, Banning
Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone,
46 INT'L. ORO. 187, 207-08 (1992); see also Shimberg, supra note 124, at 2185.
126 Haas, supra note 125, at 208.
1" See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing
International Environmental Injury, 14 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 82 (1981). Bilder
illustrates other unilateral action-forcing advances in multilateral agreements, such as
the use of U.S. legislation to impose regulations on the design, construction, and
operation of foreign carriers in U.S. waters by 1976 unless international standards were
adopted before that date. Id.
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Unilateral restrictions can also provide the "teeth" in a weak inter-
national regulatory regime. For instance, U.S. threats to use the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson amendments shored up the weak regulatory
regime established by the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling (ICRW).'23 Finally, national-level restrictions can demon-
strate the feasibility of a given regulatory approach, encouraging other
states to adopt similar approaches and incorporate them into a multi-
lateral regime. Such restrictions have no direct impact on another
country's regulations for its internal market; they apply only to produc-
ers seeking access to a regulating state's markets. 29
Still, employment of unilateral import restrictions has significant
drawbacks. Unilateral action may lead to inconsistent requirements by
different countries. For example, if producers must meet several sets
of environmental or safety rules to operate in several markets, they will
more strongly oppose any regulation."' Southern countries have been
especially vociferous in opposing unilateral restrictions, fearing that their
exports will be denied access to Northern markets if they do not com-
ply with strict Northern-imposed conditions. These states have further
argued that restrictions too easily serve as a cover for protection of
domestic producers. For example, Mexico perceived the dolphin by-
catch provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act as unfairly
protecting the U.S. tuna fleet from Latin American competition, rea-
soning that if the United States were serious about protecting dolphins
it would not allow its own fleets to continue to kill up to 20,500 dolphins
per year in purse seine nets.'
Several approaches could accommodate both the desire for multilat-
eral solutions and the need to maintain national ability to act if such
solutions remain inaccessible or ineffective. One approach is to allow
unilateral import restrictions to protect resources outside the regulat-
ing state only where a multilateral regime does not exist or is ineffec-
'2 Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments,
17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293,297 (1989). The ICRW has been criticized not only
because it lacks effective sanction and enforcement powers, but also because parties
can object to whaling schedules and thus avoid being bound by them. Accordingly,
U.S. laws have been important in achieving the objectives of the Convention. Id. See
also David Caron, International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and the Law of the
Sea, 16 ECOLOOy L.Q. 311 (1989).
129 In that sense, unilateral measures are not really "extraterritorial" at all; they
merely prevent the exporting state's regulation (or lack thereof) from overriding the
domestic policy choices of the importing state.
'3 See Bilder, supra note 127, at 85-86.
"' See Red de Libre Comercio, La Problema Tuna-Delfin (1992) (on file with
author).
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live. Domestic restrictions would serve as interim measures, providing
guidance for establishing new or amended agreements, and exerting po-
litical and economic pressure to conclude agreements or to strengthen
existing ones to ensure adequate monitoring, compliance, and sanction
mechanisms.3 2 The difficulty with this approach is determining when
a multilateral arrangement in a given area is strong enough to be ef-
fective. For example, although the whaling convention is currently in
effect, its enforceability has in large measure been due only to the threat
of unilateral trade-related actions.
Another important control on the use of unilateral restrictions would
be an agreement along the lines of GAT's national treatment provi-
sions. That is, domestic producers must stop employing practices which
foreign producers would be precluded from using. 133 Thus, the U.S.
fishing fleet would have to stop using driftnets or purse seine nets in
order for the United States to prohibit the entrance of tuna or fish
products caught with such methods. 134 Finally, where the problem
involves the practices of a Southern country, rules might specify that
import restrictions must be combined with technical and financial
assistance to assist the exporting country in ceasing the objectionable
practice as soon as possible.
31
These limiting provisions will ensure that national trade restrictions
are used judiciously in the service of global environmental protection,
without forcing states to renounce useful tools in the name of a pur-
ported multilateralism that ignores the real processes of multilateral
decisionmaking.
I32 See Bilder, supra note 127, at 91-92.
'3 This criterion becomes difficult to apply when there is no domestic production
of the products sought to be regulated, as often occurs in the case of tropical timber.
A possible solution would be to apply an equivalence test: before a country could apply
import restrictions against unsustainably produced tropical timber, it would have to
produce its own timber in a sustainable manner.
'1 See Driftnet Act Amendment, 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1990) (prohibiting use of
driftnets by domestic fleet). But see MMPA, 16 U.S.C. 137 1(a)(2) (1990) (allowing
use of purse seine fishing nets by permit but limiting incidental dolphin kill). Under
the only permit issued under § 1371(a)(2), the incidental catch is limited to 20,500.
Ross, supra note 49, at 346-47.
" Under GATT, this approach appears feasible. GATT distinguishes among
countries by their levels of economic development, allowing countries "the
econom[ies] of which support low standards of living" and which are "in the early
stages of development" to derogate from many of GATT's provisions. See
GATT, supra note I1, art. XVIII & pt. IV (special rules for less-developed
contracting parties). A similar differentiation by level of development would be
easily implemented in this case. Of course, another way of approaching the extraterri-
toriality issue is to differentiate imports, whenever possible, by production
process and not country of origin. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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C. Competitiveness, Subsidies, and Countervailing Duties
The competitiveness issue provides a third example of the tension
between the need for global standards and the reality of inadequate
global institutions. Again, current trade law makes inaction the only
alternative to globally enforceable standards.
In the long run, the switch to clean, ecologically sound production
methods will benefit producers by lowering costs, while improving the
environment and conserving resources."' However, in the short term,
the switch to clean production methods will require outlays of capital
for research and development, higher-priced substitutes for hazardous
processing materials, new production technology, and plant construc-
tion. These costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices. Producers may be reluctant to make the switch or may oppose
laws forcing such changes, because of worries that they will be under-
sold by foreign producers who need not implement such changes.
From the GATT perspective, these differences in cost due to varying
production methods and regulations merely reflect part of a country's
comparative advantage, and should not be compensated."r Significantly,
this view gives the biggest competitive advantage to the countries with
the least regulation. It defeats the key environmental goal of "internal-
izing" all production costs, such as the costs associated with resource
use, pollution control, and clean-up, into product prices to ensure that
the "polluter pays.
138
The structure of GAIT makes internalizing costs exceedingly diffi-
cult. In order to deal with the competitive consequences of differing
i3 OmCE OF TECHNOLOGy ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARD-
OUS WASTE FOR POLLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL E &cmNcy 9 (1986); Joel S. Hirschhorn,
Cutting Production of Hazardous Waste, TEcH. REV., Apr. 1988, at 52, 53.
'" Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 16-24. The traditional view of
comparative advantage holds that overall social welfare will increase if countries with
differing natural and social endowments specialize in producing those products they
can make most pro fitably, and trade with other countries for the rest of their needs. For
a cogent critique of this theory under conditions of capital mobility, see DALY & COBB,
supra note 10, ch. 11. The GAIT Secretariat has endorsed the theory of comparative
advantage for over twenty years. See GAIT, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1971) (arguing against tariffs to cover pollution control costs).
M The "polluter pays" principle is a theory of cost-allocation first established in
1972 by the OECD and subsequently adopted by the European Community. Sanford
E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental
Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 467 (1991). It holds that the costs of pollution
prevention and control should be borne by the polluter and reflected in the costs of
goods and services. Id. at 468. As a result, the "polluter pays" principle generally
discourages subsidies, although it allows exceptions for technological innovation,
transitional periods, and aid to depressed regions. Id. at 476.
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levels of national regulation, states can attempt to characterize the lack
of regulation abroad as a subsidy, and impose countervailing duties, such
as import taxes, equivalent to the amount foreign industry saves by not
having to comply with the importing country's stricter requirements.
Or states may provide subsidies to domestic industry to make up the
difference. Despite the apparent logic of these approaches, both are
currently at odds with GATT.
Article I's most-favored-nation principle forbids states from impos-
ing different tariffs on "like" products, even if they are produced with
differing environmental costs. 139 Article VI deals with "dumping," or
selling products below the selling price in the exporting country. While
Article VI allows consideration of "production costs" under certain
circumstances in determining whether a product has been dumped,
environmental costs are not part of the dumping equation.
14
Article XVI allows domestic subsidies only if they do not operate
directly or indirectly to increase exports or decrease imports. Because
subsidies to help domestic industry comply with strict environmental
regulation affect trade by changing relative price structures, they are
subject to challenge. Thus, impermissible subsidies, along with prod-
uct dumping, can subject goods to countervailing duties if such prac-
tices harm domestic industry. However, a lack of environmental regu-
lation has never been classified as an impermissible subsidy, nor have
countervailing duties ever been imposed on products because of "en-
vironmental dumping.'' Moreover, trade challenges must be based on
economic injury to a competitive industry, not on injury to larger
community interests such as the environment.
Several writers have suggested that trade agreements should allow
'" See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing products and processes
under the precautionary principle).
140 GATr, supra note 11. art. VI (1)(b)(ii) allows price constructions based on
production costs plus margins for selling costs and profit, in cases where the exported
product is not sold in the home market. But the values of environmental services and
resources that are not included in the production cost, because of inadequate regula-
tion, are not now considered part of the production cost.
"4 Countervailing duty determinations are made by national entities. In the United
States, the Secretary of Commerce is responsible for determining if aproduct has been
dumped or a subsidy granted, while the International Trade Commission (ITC)
determines whether domestic industry has been injured. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1991). In
a recent case, the Commerce Department and the ITC determined that Canadian
lumber was receiving an export subsidy, in part because Canadian lumber exporters
were paying exceedingly low "stumpage" rates to cut trees on national lands. 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,570 (1992). Although the determination did not rest on environmental
grounds, it could be viewed as an example of the potential for subsidy and countervailing
duty determinations to incorporate environmental factors, in this case undervalued
resource pricing.
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states to impose countervailing duties in cases where a lack of envi-
ronmental regulation constitutes an indirect subsidy. 42 A proposal in-
troduced in the U.S. Congress would do just that, in an attempt to
eliminate the competitive advantages gained by failures to internalize
environmental costs. 143 The problem, of course, is defining what con-
stitutes "lax" regulation. Ideally, using countervailing duties in such a
way requires a "baseline" standard against which to judge a country's
performance. Those countries which fail to meet the standard would
have their exports penalized to the extent of the relevant cost differ-
ences. However, this requires standard-setting on an international level,
and again, no international institutional structure exists to undertake this
task. Furthermore, while the GATT Secretariat's position, that a state's
level of environmental regulation is merely a factor of comparative
advantage, is vastly overstated, it is true that some differences in regu-
lation stem from real differences in geography, population, industry
density, and level of technological development. A global regulatory
body should be able to take these differences into account in tailoring
the application of standards.'"
The problem then becomes what to do in the absence of such an ideal
solution. One proposal is to allow each importing state to compare the
exporting state's regulations to its own, and apply duties equal to the
extra cost that would have been incurred had the exporter abided by
the environmental requirements prevailing in the importing country. 45
While not forcing a nation to adopt a certain level of environmental
protection, this approach would provide an incentive to do so in the
form of lower tariff rates. It would eliminate the competitive disadvan-
tage of highly regulated producers and put pressure on states to raise
their standards.
Implementing this approach, however, would require changes to the
dumping, subsidy, and countervailing duty articles of GATT and to the
42 See, e.g., ARDEN-CLARK, supra note 3, at 5; Patterson, supra note 120, at 10,602;
Steven Shrybman, Trading Away the Environment, 9 WORLD POLY J. 93 (1991).
"' See International Pollution Deterrence Actof 1991, S. 984, 102dCong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (setting countervailing duties on goods produced where there is a failure to
impose and enforce effective pollution controls equivalent to those imposed on U.S.
producers).
" One possibility is a system of minimum international standards which countries
could exceed if they wished. A minimum global standard would not eliminate the
competitive disadvantage of the most highly regulated states, although it would reduce
it. But if global standards are set as maximums, the competitive disadvantage issue
will be solved at the expense of the environment, by reducing international standards
to the least common denominator. This is one flaw in current proposals to harmonize
food safety standards. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
' See Patterson, supra note 120, at 10,602.
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concept of "injury."'' Under current law, the proceeds of countervailing
duty actions are not returned to the affected sector. Thus, a cost-equal-
izing tariff would not be targeted to improve the environment in either
the exporting or importing country. This shortcoming could be remedied
by creating a fund with the proceeds of a compensatory tariff, to be
used for grants to improve the environment in those countries whose
regulation is found lacking. Such a targeted fund would reduce the
equity concerns, but the question remains how such a fund would be
administered.147
. Nonetheless, several drawbacks remain. First, under a countervailing
duty scheme based on the importing state's standards, foreign produc-
ers will have no incentive to voluntarily exceed national regulatory stan-
dards and internalize more of their costs.'" Second, the proposal will
tend to penalize producers in poorer Southern countries, placing addi-
tional obstacles in the way of their access to Northern markets. Third,
it directs attention to traditional, easily measurable pollution control
equipment, such as scrubbers, filters, and other "end-of-pipe" controls,
rather than to the changes in inputs, materials handling, or design that
constitute a pollution prevention approach. Moreover, the entities set-
ting the tariffs would have difficulty comparing different methods of
achieving the same result in terms of environmental quality, and with
measuring key cost variables, such as liability systems.
146 As discussed above, parties can now petition the government to initiate dumping
or countervailing duty determinations if they can show injury to their ability to
compete. The definition of injury would have to be modified to allow public interest
groups or other petitioners to allege injury to the environment.
147 An international body could be charged with this task, or it could be left to
national agencies in the importing country. Recipient countries might of course object
that such an approach is paternalistic, and that such funds should be channelled to them
directly.
"4 For example, assume a Spanish manufacturer can make widgets for $.80 each,
while it costs a German manufacturers a dollar to make the same widget. If $. 10 of the
difference is due to stricter pollution laws, and S. 10 due to lower wages, current rules
allow the Spanish manufacturer to undersell the German, despite the partial subsidy
provided by lax environmental regulation. Assuming we can accurately quantify how
much of a subsidy is provided by the less strict regulation, suppose Germany imposes
a S. 10 tariff on Spanish widget imports, which then still undersell German widgets, but
by a smaller degree. The Spanish manufacturer has no incentive to push for stricter
environmental legislation, because it is still underselling the German widgets, and if
the Spanish regulations were tightened, widgets would still cost S.90 rather than $.80
(due to the removal of the partial subsidy or incorporation of the true environmental
costs). Rather, the rational reaction would be to shift from exports to domestic
production, export to markets where no such scheme existed, or lower wages or other
costs to compensate for the tariff. Furthermore, those Spanish manufacturers willing
or able to exceed national standards for waste or water discharges would actually have
a disincentive to do so, since they would have a tariff imposed on their goods regardless
of their actions.
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An alternative approach would focus directly on exporters rather than
on states, as in the case of damaging production processes.'4 9 Such an
approach would require an exporter to certify that it has taken certain
specified steps to internalize environmental costs, equivalent to those
domestic producers must take. It would focus not on state regulations
but on specific enterprises, perhaps with phase-in periods or exceptions
for small businesses. One relatively straightforward method would
require transnational corporations to comply with the regulations of
either their home country or the host country, whichever were stricter.150
This approach might be acceptable to many transnational corporations
which now assert they meet the standards in the host country. It also
removes any incentive for companies to invest in facilities abroad in
order to avoid their home country's stricter standards. This approach
would be quite effective, but it would also require major changes in
GATT rules to allow for such differentiation in imports.1
5 1
In all three issues-export restrictions, extraterritorial import restric-
tions, and competitiveness--the underlying problem is how to continue
to move towards global institutions, without depriving states of their
ability to provide the only level of protection which will be effective
while such institutions are aborning. As it stands, GATI makes zero
regulation the only alternative to multilateral regulation. If the global




AND PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS WITHIN GATT
Parts I through III of this article explored how current trade law
departs from the precautionary principle, and proposed ways in which
GATT can be changed to address these problems. If such changes are
to succeed, they must be accompanied by changes in the ways in which
trade agreements are negotiated, disputes are settled, and standards are
set. This Part elaborates on some of the institutional changes needed
to make GATT compatible with principles of effective environmental
19 See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
SO Gaines, supra note 138, at 489-90.
"' Seventy percent of the world's trade now involves transnational corporations.
GREENMEAC, BEYOND UNCED 13 (1992). Many of these corporations are already
subject to reporting requirements on their operations, for instance, through securities-
related filings. A system of self-reporting combined with periodic inspections might
suffice to enforce such an approach.
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protection.
Principles of global environmental law recognize the need for public
access to information and debate on activities which affect the envi-
ronment. For example, the Bergen Declaration emphasizes "the impor-
tance of participation by a well-informed and well-educated society so
as to allow the public to mobilize itself... and to encourage open debate
on the environmental implications of national policies."'5 2 Similarly, the
Bangkok Declaration "affirm[s] the right of individuals and non-gov-
ernmental organizations to be informed of environmental problems
relative to them, to have the necessary access to information, and to
participate in the formulation and implementation of decisions likely
to affect their environment."' 53 Such public participation is attainable
through equal access and due process in administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings, 54 and through prior environmental assessment of proposed
activities which may significantly affect the environment 5
In contrast to this emphasis on openness and public participation,
current trade rules permit unaccountability, secrecy, and limited access.
Trade negotiations are carried out behind closed doors, negotiating
documents are restricted' 56 and major decisions are often made during
informal consultations where votes are not public. 57 Although affected
industry groups may act as advisors to their countries' delegations, no
provision allows similar input from nongovernmental consumer or other
public interest groups.58 Once the negotiations are completed, there is
little opportunity for the public or their elected representatives to raise
challenges. 159
102 Bergen Declaration, supra note 22, paras. 16, 16(e).
"s Bangkok Declaration, supra note 23, para. 27.
's WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., supra note 14, Principle 6.
1s5 Id., Principle 5; see also World Charter for Nature, spra note 13, art. Il(c).
156 For example, negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement have
been carried out in secret. Interested groups, including members of Congress, were
forced to rely on a leaked draft, and the full text was not released until weeks after the
agreement was completed. Linda Diebel, Leaked Document Reveals Massive 3-Way
Trade Plan, ToRoNro STAR, Mar. 24, 1992, at Al.
07 See RAGHAVAN, supra note 31, at 59-65.
1' Although a smattering of labor and environmental advisors were added to a few
trade advisory committees in the wake of congressional opposition to fast track
authority for NAFTA, these advisory groups remain heavily weighted towards repre-
sentatives of transnational corporations. Tom Hilliard, Trade Advisory Committees:
Privileged Access for Polluters (1991) (unpublished report, Public Citizen, Wash.,
D.C.).
19 For example, in the United States, Congress considers trade agreements under
special "fast track" procedures, which provide for limited debate and no amendments
to the agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1992). Under fast track, Congress has only 60 to
90 days to consider complex trade agreements submitted by the President. While the
purpose of fast track is to make it easier for U.S. negotiators to conclude a deal without
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Dispute resolution procedures are also far from transparent. Most
disputes between contracting parties are settled through secret, infor-
mal consultations, and those that cannot be settled informally are re-
ferred to ad hoc dispute resolution panels. 160 These three-member panels
are drawn from lists made up almost entirely of Geneva-based govern-
ment trade negotiators, and most of the work is done by the lawyers
of the GATT Secretariat. The panels' deliberations, the arguments
presented, the briefs submitted, and the initial panel report are all secret.
Only after a panel report has been approved by the contracting parties
does it become public. 16' Furthermore, interested parties can neither
intervene nor act as amici curiae, and expert testimony may be used
only to the extent the parties agree to it.
62
Proposed changes to the dispute resolution process will exacerbate
the lack of public input and transparency. The December 1991 draft
of the Uruguay Round of GAIT (Dunkel text) proposes amending the
dispute resolution process to give more teeth to panel decisions. As it
now stands, panel reports are binding only when approved unanimously
by the parties to GAIT, and the loser in a dispute may prevent the panel
decision from being adopted. Under the proposed rules, a panel deci-
sion would be automatically adopted within sixty days unless GATT
parties unanimously oppose it, an unlikely prospect.1 63 To offset this
drastic delegation of power, the Dunkel text envisions a standing
danger of it being modified during the normal legislative process, the effect is to
transfer enormous power from Congress to the executive branch. See Wallach &
Hilliard, supra note 52, at 1. For a thorough review of the fast track procedure and its
implications, see Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast Track for International Trade
Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471 (1990).
Similarly, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC)
approves trade agreements binding on all EEC countries without further approval from
national legislatures. The Emerging European Constitution, 72 AM. Soc. INT'L L. Paoc.
166, 183-89 (1978) (remarks of Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Prof. of Law, U. Cal., Berkeley).
'6' See Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and
Does Not, 29 Swiss REv. IT'L. CoMP. L. 81 (1987).
161 GATT, supra note 11. art. XXIII. merely permits the contracting parties to
intervene in disputes between parties. The use of dispute resolution panels to do so was
formalized as part of the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round. See Mid-term
Review: Final Agreement at Geneva, 61 GATT Focus 1, 9-12 (1989).
'u For example, the parties in theThai Cigarette case agreed to allow testimony from
the World Health Organization only on the dangers of smoking, an uncontested point,
and not on whether Thailand's import restrictions helped reduce smoking risks. See
Thai Cigarette Case, supra note 43, paras. 3, 50. Similarly, in the Tuna-Dolphin
decision, the panel refused to take testimony from an expert on dolphins. See Tuna-
Dolphin decision, supra note 49. Under changes proposed in the Uruguay Round,
panels would have the right to seek information and technical expertise, but there is
still no provision for outside experts or parties to intervene or to initiate contact with
the panel. Dunkel text, supra note 71, at S.11.1.
" Dunkel text, supra note 71, at S.15.
[Vol.7, 1992]
HeinOnline -- 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 94 1992
Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of International Trade Law 95
appellate review body overseeing panel decisions and creating a more
uniform corpus of law.'"
Additionally, under in the current system, dispute panels may only
recommend changes to a losing party's trade policies. If the loser
chooses not to comply, the complainant state's only recourse is to
request permission to impose retaliatory sanctions. However, these
sanctions have rarely been approved; rather, most trade retaliation takes
place through domestic law. 65 Proposed changes to the dispute reso-
lution process would eliminate the use of domestic laws and channel
all dispute resolution through the panel process, or through arbitration
if the parties request it. While these changes are intended to rationalize
the system and give it greater power, they also perpetuate the lack of
public participation and public scrutiny of the existing procedures.
The lack of public access is problematic because the scope of trade
law has expanded to cover areas with policy implications far broader
than trade alone. The Uruguay Round will further increase the scope
of activities under GAT' jurisdiction. The inclusion of health, envi-
ronmental, and similar issues within the purview of GATT dispute
resolution raises serious questions of public accountability and insti-
tutional competence. These issues, because of the complex interests at
stake, are more appropriately decided by elected bodies than by inter-
national civil servants insulated from public scrutiny. Moreover, dis-
pute panel members and the legal staff that assist them are experts in
trade only, and see their mandate as restricted to trade questions, ig-
noring the broader implications of their decisions. Thus, the panel in
the Tuna-Dolphin decision "wished to underline that its task was lim-
ited to the examination of this matter 'in the light of the relevant GAIT
provisions."" 66 Although the panel denied it was passing judgment on
U.S. conservation policies, the effect of its decision, if adopted by the
GAIT Council,'167 would be to force the United States to choose be-
164 Id.
"' While domestic trade law in the United States generally follows GAT'T prin-
ciples, the United States reserves the right to unilaterally decide and retaliate when
foreign practices unjustifiably burden U.S. commerce. See Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 301, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
'" Tuna-Dolphin decision, supra note 49, para 6.1. In an earlier case, a dispute
resolution panel declined to consider the purpose of a tax destined to fund cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. The panel found that "[whether a sales tax is levied on a product
for general revenue purposes or to encourage the rational use of environmental
resources, is ... not relevant .... Re Superfund Taxes, supra note 78. para. 5.2.4.
"1 The condemnation by environmentalists and others of the Tuna-Dolphin deci-
sion led to a request by Mexico to defer consideration of the panel's report by the
Council; thus, technically speaking, the decision is not binding. However, its main
conclusions have been endorsed by the GATT Secretariat. See Trade & Environment,
supra note 1, at 15.
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tween amending part of its domestic conservation legislation or facing
trade retaliation. Yet the decision was made with no input from envi-
ronmental lawyers or conservation experts. Despite the proposed ad-
dition of an appellate body, under the Dunkel text panels will continue
to consist solely of trade experts, rather than reflecting a balance of
perspectives.1
6
To be brought into line with international law's principles of trans-
parency and accessibility, the current and proposed processes of nego-
tiation, dispute resolution, and standard-setting must be revised. Nego-
tiations can be made more transparent by allowing nongovernmental
observers at working group meetings and by requiring notice and
comment periods before an agreement is set in stone. Observers and
notice and comment procedures must be introduced early enough in the
negotiation process to allow potential negative effects to be recognized
and prevention or mitigation measures taken. 69 While this may well
slow the negotiation process and force parties to reopen settled points,
it will be necessary to ensure that such agreements are based on com-
plete information and reflect a broader range of views.
Two possible models exist for reforming the dispute resolution pro-
cess. One is to continue to increase judicialization, making the panel
system more like a true court. The proposed reforms of the Uruguay
Round are a step in that direction, but opening the process requires more.
Amici and intervenor status should be granted to affected parties who
believe they are not well represented by the disputants.170 Notice of
challenges, as well as panel arguments and briefs, should be made
public. Panel composition should reflect a range of perspectives, not
I" The Dunkel text proposes that "[planels shall be composed of well-qualified
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have
served on or presented acase to a GATT panel, served as a representative to the GATT
or in the GATT Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy,
or served as a senior trade policy official of a contracting party." Dunkel text, supra
note 71, at S.7, para 6.1.
'" The timing of public comments or environmental assessments is critical. If it
comes too early, public comment could force parties to commit to negotiating posi-
tions which may still be fluid, aggravating the strategic game-playing of negotiations;
if such information arises too late, parties might object to revisiting delicate com-
promises because of unforeseen environmental impacts. In the Uruguay Round, for
example, GAIT officials have recognized the existence of environmental problems
but have argued the negotiations are too far advanced to deal with them in this round.
I" For example, the U.S .Commerce Department, which was responsible for defend-
ing the Marine Mammal Protection Act provisions at issue in the Tuna-Dolphin
decision, was successfully sued in U.S. federal court to compel enforcement of those
same provisions. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mossbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal.
1990), affd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). The U.S. executive's reluctance to enforce
the law raises doubts about its zealousness in defending the same law before a GAT
panel.
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simply those of trade experts. Alternatively, disputes involving envi-
ronment, conservation, health, or consumer issues could be referred to
non-trade entities, which would participate in the proceedings and sign
off on decisions. Appropriate non-trade entities would include the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) or other specialized
U.N. agencies, or treaty secretariats.171
Another model would expand the consultation procedures of Article
XXII. Rather than a judicialized model, the model is more similar
to regulatory negotiation.' Interested or affected parties would be
brought into the process of designing a mutually acceptable solution.
Notice and comment procedures or use of a convenor or ombudsman
would ensure that the views of affected parties were represented. The
parties would have a set time in which to resolve the dispute, with
recourse to arbitration if they could not. This is a much more radical
solution than the judicial model, in that it reduces the state to one actor
among many, allowing for representation by affected businesses, non-
governmental groups, and even local communities. It reflects the present
trend in international law, away from a state-based system towards a
pluralistic model in which individuals and groups are subjects and
participants.'74 It also allows for better-tailored solutions to complex
'7' Mere consultation, however, without an obligation to take the agency's views
into account, is inadequate: in the Thai Cigarette case, for example, the panel consulted
with the World Health Organization, but then ignored its recommendations. See Thai
Cigarette case, supra note 43, and accompanying text.
172 "The contracting parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with
any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter from which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution." GATT, supra note 11, art. XXII(2).
7 See Phillip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J.
1(1982). Congress recently passed legislation allowing regulatory negotiation ("reg-
neg") by U.S. administrative agencies. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The statute
provides that negotiations are to be encouraged where there are a limited number of
identifiable interests that are significantly affected by a rule, there is a reasonable
likelihood a committee can be convened with a balanced representation of persons who
can adequately represent the interests at stake, and there is a possibility of consensus.
Id. § 583. Agencies may use conveners to identify the appropriate interests and
persons. Id. The agency must publish a public announcement of the intent to convene
a committee, along with the interests and persons involved; additional persons may
apply to be on the committee if they feel their interests are not adequately represented.
Id. § 584. The maximum size of the committee is 25. Id. § 585. Since its enactment,
the law has been widely applied by U.S. agencies, including EPA, the FCC, and the
Departments of Energy and Transportation. The reg-neg law provides an excellent
model for international trade, as the subject matter of these federal agencies reaches
a similarly high level of complexity and technical sophistication.
"7 See Phillippe Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30
HA'iv. INr'L L.J. 393 (1989); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of the Individual Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
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problems, which are sometimes ill-suited to the binary nature of a
judicialized process. 7 Furthermore, a regulatory negotiation model
allows affected communities to be directly involved, rather than par-
ticipating through the mediation of large NGOs, which are mostly
Northern-based, and whose perception of problems and solutions may
at times differ from those they purport to represent.
Finally, opening up the trade policy process will require a new mode
of standard-setting. To the extent economic and ecological globalization
are accompanied by moves towards political globalization, international
standards will be required. Standard-setting bodies will need to be
transparent and reflect a wide-range of scientific and policy opinion.
The Codex Alimentarius Commission, the U.N.-related body charged
with setting global food safety and pesticide residue standards, is pres-
ently dominated by chemical, food, and pharmaceutical producers, and
the standards it has proposed set ceilings, rather than minimum limits,
on regulation. 16 Groups like Codex, if they are to be responsible for
devising international norms, should be reformed to include a wider
range of expert opinion, to make proposed standards subject to both
peer review and public comment, and to revisit standards periodically.
CONCLUSION
International trade rules, as embodied in GAT articles and decisions,
depart significantly from the precautionary principle and the principles
of participation and access. This article has highlighted some of the areas
of departure and suggested solutions. But more than specific amend-
ments or procedures, what is needed is a change in priorities. The free
movement of goods and capital is only a means, not an end in itself.
Environmental protection, on the other hand, is intrinsic to the continu-
ance of life. It must take precedence if humans, and the species we share
the planet with, are to survive.
" See Barry B. Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial Type Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MicH. L. REv. I11
(1972).
"' Most of the U.S. delegation to Codex, for example, consists of scientists tied to
the agribusiness or pharmaceutical sectors. Mark Richie, GAIT, Agriculture and the
Environment, 20 ECOl.OGTST 214, 216 (1990).
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